Child Health Weeks (CHWs) are semi-annual, campaign-style, facility-and outreach-based events that provide a package of high-impact nutrition and health services to under-five children. Since 1999, 30% of the 85 countries that regularly implement campaign-style vitamin A supplementation programmes have transformed their programmes into CHW. Using data drawn from districts' budget, expenditures and salary documents, UNICEF's CHW planning and budgeting tool and a special purposive survey, an economic analysis of the June 2010 CHW's provision of measles, vitamin A and deworming was conducted using activity-based costing combined with an ingredients approach. Total CHW costs were estimated to be US$5.7 million per round. Measles accounted for 57%, deworming 22% and vitamin A 21% of total costs. The cost per child was US$0.46. The additional supplies and personnel required to include measles increased total costs by 42%, but reduced the average costs of providing vitamin A and deworming alone, manifesting economies of scope. The average costs of covering larger, more urban populations was less than the cost of covering smaller, more dispersed populations. Provincial-level costs per child served were determined primarily by the number of service sites, not the number of children treated. Reliance on volunteers to provide 60% of CHW manpower enables expanding coverage, shortening the duration of CHWs and reduces costs by one-third. With costs of $1093 per life saved and $45 per disability-adjusted life-year saved, WHO criteria classify Zambia's CHWs as 'very cost-effective'. The continued need for CHWs is discussed.
Reliance on volunteers for 60% of CHW manpower enables expanding coverage, shortening the duration of CHW and reducing costs by one-third. Provincial variations in average total costs were determined primarily by the number of service sites, not the number of children treated.
The national average cost per child served per round was US$0.46. With a cost of $1093 per life saved and $45 per disability-adjusted life-year saved, WHO criteria classify Zambia's CHW as 'very cost-effective'.
Background
Deficiencies of three essential micronutrients-vitamin A, iron and zinc-are estimated to result in an annual loss of 1.5 million lives and more than 51 million disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) (Caulfield et al. 2006) . Systematic efforts to reduce them through supplementation and food fortification programmes started nearly a century ago-in the 1920s-in Switzerland, Great Britain and the USA. It was not until the end of the 1980s, however, that public health attention and resources began to be devoted to these interventions in lowerand middle-income countries (WHO and FAO 2005) . The first large-scale efforts in these countries consisted of supplement distribution programmes. In the case of vitamin A, the early programmes consisted of rounds that piggy-backed on immunization campaigns. As there was little knowledge of the importance of vitamin A in the general population at the time-and thus little demand for it-linking vitamin A supplementation to already-existing, popular immunization programmes were a strategic approach that enabled achieving substantial coverage rates very quickly. Piggy-backing immunization programmes also enabled keeping the costs of distributing vitamin A low, and facilitated planning while minimizing organizational and administrative requirements, thereby making this new activity relatively more politically acceptable and more financially sustainable.
Since 1999, 30% of the 85 countries that regularly implement campaign-style, vitamin A supplementation programmes have transformed their vitamin A distribution platforms from immunization campaigns into what have come to be commonly called Child Health Days or Child Health Weeks (CHWs) (UNICEF 2010 , Oliphant et al. 2010 , UNICEF 2011 . CHWs are large-scale, mass mobilization-based events undertaken semi-annually to provide an integrated package of services. While the size and composition of the service package varies by country, the mean number of services provided by a CHW is four and all CHWs include vitamin A supplementation and some immunizations and mostly include anthelmintics (Table 1) .
From 1999 to 2006, CHWs grew in number and importance, particularly in Africa. While their initial development owes in large part to supply-related considerations, their high and generally sustained popularity owes significantly to a demandrelated characteristic; viz., the fact that they provide mothers with 'one-stop shopping' for multiple services for all their pre-school children, thereby reducing households' direct and indirect costs of obtaining these services. The growing popularity of CHWs is manifested in the substantial increases in coverage rates they have posted over most of the past decade. Figure 1 shows the evolution in coverage rates of the 103 UNICEF-priority vitamin A supplementation countries.
While CHWs have become a common feature of many lowincome country delivery systems, there remains a dearth of published descriptive accounts or analyses of them (Fiedler and Chuko 2008) . Policymakers and programme managers have a host of important questions that they need to know the answers to but which, for the most part, remain unaddressed, including: What do they cost? Are they worth it? What inputs are their key cost drivers (e.g. human resources, supplies, social mobilization)? What are the principal determinants of their costs? Are the cost savings realized by the common practice of relying on volunteers significant? What is the additional cost to the health system to conduct CHWs and can it be sustainable? Do CHWs increase coverage? Are there economies of scope in the provision of CHW services? That is, does the average cost of providing a particular service to a child fall as the number of services included in a CHW package increase? Is it possible to add so many services to the package that the programme's efficiency falls and average costs increase? Which interventions should be included in this kind of platform and which ones shouldn't be?
Are CHWs still necessary? Are they becoming impediments to countries introducing new, more appropriate, cost-effective or more sustainable services? This article presents a Zambian case study and attempts to contribute to the discussion of the role, cost and value of CHWs.
The Zambian context
Started in 1999, Zambia's CHW targets children under five with a package of high-impact preventive services, including vitamin A supplementation, growth monitoring and promotion (GMP), vaccinations, deworming (since 2003) and (since 2004) promotion of and intermittent treatment of insecticide-treated mosquito nets. CHW is a 6-day event held in June and December. The programme is implemented in all the Ministry of Health's (MOH's) 1351 health facilities (HFs) and, in the course of the week, 10 500 temporary distribution points are set up throughout the country. The in-facility and 1515 outreach teams, alike, are generally comprised of five persons: two MOH Growth monitoring 10 40
Bed-net distribution 6 24
Other 9 36
Source: Rice (2008). staff, aided by three volunteers. Starting a day or two before, and continuing throughout CHW, there is a massive social mobilization effort involving both setting up this more accessible delivery system and encouraging mothers to bring their young children (6À59 months old) to receive services, as well as to motivate the MOH staff and others to participate, thereby ensuring high coverage rates. It is estimated that nearly 60% of the implementing manpower is comprised of volunteers and 30% of the entire Zambian population participates in each round. From its inception, CHW has achieved high coverage rates, ranging from 60% to more than 100% (Figure 2 ). The CHW coverage rate reached its zenith, 106%, during the June 14-19, 2010 exercise, the specific round that is the focus of this study.
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The structure, general financing and operations of CHWs CHWs are co-ordinated by the MOH's Child Health Technical Working Group, which is comprised of representatives of the MOH's Child Health Unit (CHU), the National Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC) and partner organizations (Figure 3 ). The CHU serves as the CHW secretariat. Each level of the MOH's pyramidal structure participates in some aspect of the CHW. The role of the Central Office and the Provincial Health Office (PHO) is primarily in the early, initial planning of a round and the training of trainers' activities, and then again, later in the monitoring and supervision of the 6-day implementation. The District Health Offices (DHOs) have primary responsibility and are the management hub in the implementation of CHW (and of all public health activities) in Zambia's decentralized health system.
The DHOs' CHW planned activities are incorporated into the Districts' Annual Action Plans which are funded by the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ). UNICEF generally provides substantial in-kind support, as well, including mebendazole, whereas the Micronutrient Initiative (MI) has provided the vitamin A capsules.
UNICEF has been the most important partner organization in providing support to CHW. Its support, however, has varied substantially by year (Figure 4) forcing the MOH to adapt CHW implementation to funding levels. The primary means by which it has done so has been in adjusting the intensity of supervision, and the levels of incentive payments to volunteers and payments of Daily Subsistence Allowances (DSA) and lunches. Of course, the levels fluctuate in the other direction too. In 2010, for instance, there were considerably more resources than the norm, and, therefore, less or no need to pool them and back-fit them into the smaller budget. (In unsolicited comments made during the survey, each of the five PHOs interviewed noted that the resources in the June 2010 round were inadequate.) The relatively greater availability of resources that year resulted in more supervision, more outreach teams and additional follow-up. Variations in funding have also contributed to local variations in implementation, as the decision as to how to respond to budget fluctuations has been managed mostly by the DHOs.
The annual CHW cycle kicks off 1 month before the June round with a national-level orientation meeting in which national-level trainers train PHO staff and review the previous CHW round, provide updates and refresher training in technical information, provide advocacy, promotion and Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials and plan logistics. Orientation meetings are organized into a cascading system. After the national meeting in which PHO staff are trained, the PHO staff train DHO staff, who in turn train HF staff and volunteers. A few days just before the start of a CHW round, district and HF level sensitization meetings are held. The purpose of these meetings is to finalize and confirm plans for the CHW, as well as to publicize and promote the upcoming event. A variety of social mobilization activities are undertaken and materials produced, such as posters, banners, puppet shows, radio and television spots. By design, each round of CHW consists of core services that all distribution sites are expected to provide. In addition, districts are allowed to provide any additional local priority services-most commonly catch-up vaccinations. Usually there are three core services: vitamin A, deworming and growth monitoring: there are also rounds that emphasize promotion and treatment of insecticide-treated mosquito nets and measles vaccination.
CHW supplies and logistics costs include the cost of the vitamin A capsules, mebendazole tablets, vaccines, syringes, safety boxes, cotton, scissors and other medical supplies required to provide the CHW services. CHW supplies are delivered from the MOH Central Office in Lusaka directly to the DHOs 1 or 2 weeks before CHW begins. Usually the DHOs repackage the supplies and spend a week distributing them to the individual HFs in their districts. CHW has three distinct service delivery models. Services are delivered in: (1) fixed or 'static' sites consisting of existing HFs, (2) in fixed outreach sites such as schools, churches and community centres and (3) in temporary outreach sites where services are provided by a mobile team of health workers, aided by local volunteers. During CHW, HFs continue to provide routine health services on demand, with roughly half of the staff working in a 'business as usual' mode. The other half of the staff is dedicated to providing CHW services, both in the facility and as part of the outreach teams. There is approximately one outreach team per HF and each outreach team provides service to seven or eight sites over the course of a CHW round. The teams generally go out 2 or 3 days before the 6-day CHW activity is slated to ensure volunteer staff are organized and other preparations are set, and to promote the event and co-ordinate social mobilization efforts. On average, HF-based teams are comprised of seven persons, and outreach teams six. Urban HF-based teams treat $50% more children per day than a rural HF-based team. The former is expected to treat $375 in a day, the latter roughly 250 and outreach teams $300.
Throughout CHW monitors/supervisors from the national, provincial and district levels travel throughout the country visiting the implementing facilities and outreach sites to ensure that supplies are available and adequate, and that services are implemented appropriately. The services provided during CHW are recorded on tally sheets, although only a subset of all of the services provided are tracked by the MOH central office; viz., vitamin A supplementation, deworming and measles vaccinations. After CHW, the HFs collect and collate the tally sheet data from their static CHW sessions and outreach sites, and submit a report to their DHOs. Each DHO compiles the data from all of its facilities and submits a summary report to its PHO, which, in turn, prepares a provincial summary report, which is submitted to the CHU.
Methodology
The study was designed to provide a comprehensive accounting of all of the resources used to provide a round of CHW with the objective of providing a better understanding of (1) how the programme is structured and implemented, and (2) the total resources required, so as to ensure adequate budgeting. It is an economic analysis, which is more comprehensive than a financial expenditure analysis. An economic analysis includes the financial expenditures, and, in addition, captures items that are contributed in kind (so called 'off-budget' items), including the in-kind contributions of UNICEF, MI, NGOs and other government agencies, such as the use of vehicles, or the 'loaning' of drivers and other staff time. The analysis here quantifies the value of these resources to capture the value of these resources from a social perspective, and also to provide insight into the magnitude of the organizational and managerial requirements of this enormous social mobilization.
The methodology employed is activity-based costing (ABC) combined with an ingredients approach. This methodology requires identifying all of the inputs required to undertake each activity at each administrative level of CHW (WHO 2003) . In a programme like CHW which has many off-budget inputs, this approach provides a more complete accounting of the resources required of the programme than the more traditional, financial cost accounting methodology.
The cost centres of this ABC are the major activities of CHW as defined by CHU and NFNC staff: (1) orientation, (2) sensitization, (3) social mobilization, (4) supplies and logistics, (5) service delivery, (6) supervision and (7) data collection and report writing. In most cases, the activities are implemented by more than one level of the MOH. Estimates were developed for each level, taking care to be comprehensive, while being sure that the activities and the resources required to implement them were defined so as to be mutually exclusive and thereby avoid double counting. The sum of the costs of each activity at each level provided the estimated costs of the programme at a particular level, and summing the costs of all four levels yields the estimated costs of the entire programme.
Data sources
There were four major data sources: the districts' ordinary Annual Action Plan and their CHW supplemental budget allocations, data collected in a survey designed and conducted as part of this study, and expenditure and salary data and documents collected as part of this study from both district finance offices. In addition, we adopted and modified parameters from UNICEF's CHW planning and budgeting tool to develop costing algorithms. The UNICEF tool is concerned exclusively with the additional direct outlays of CHW and does not include about one-third of total costs.
Personnel costs generally constitute a large proportion of CHW costs. To determine the personnel costs of the CHW programme, it was necessary to identify all personnel involved in implementing the programme's activities at each of its administrative levels. The costs of both salaried persons and CHW volunteers were estimated. Estimates of the proportion of time MOH staff and volunteers devoted to the CHW programme were developed using from a purposive sample-based interview survey that was designed and implemented as part of this study.
The key purpose of the survey was: (1) to collect information on the time input of different cadres of MOH staff at each level of the ministry (which are not otherwise quantified), (2) to collect information on the number and time input of volunteers and (3) to obtain, corroborate and triangulate data from other sources, most importantly budget documents and the UNICEF planning tool outputs. Due to the time and resource constraints, the survey was based on a purposive sample of five of Zambia's nine provinces: Central, Eastern, Luapula, Northern and Northwestern. The two wealthier and more urbanized provinces, Lusaka and Copperbelt, were not included in sample, nor were Southern or Western. The five provinces sampled account for 49% of Zambia's 2010 total population of 13 million. The sample includes 5 PHOs, 15 DHOs and 45 HFs. Within each of the five selected provinces, three districts were selected so as to include one high-performing district, one medium and one low performer. In each district, three HFs were sampled.
While the financial and in-kind support provided by UNICEF, WHO and MI are captured in the UNICEF planning tool, the survey was the only source of information on the support provided by other partner organizations. Thus, to the extent that these organizations targeted their support geographically (by district or below, which is the usual practice), these resources are under-reported in this study. Most of this type of support consists of in-kind contributions of vehicles or social marketing materials, and the level of under-reporting is thought to be relatively minor.
While the cost estimates presented here are disaggregated only to the provincial level, most of the provincial level costs were developed from HF-specific and district-specific estimates. Initially, the facility-based analyses were simply weighted by the number of facilities in a district to develop district-level estimates of all facility-level costs. Similarly, initially, all the provincial-level estimates were developed from the weighted number of districts in a province to provide total district-level costs of a province. That approach, however, proved inadequate: it did not capture the variability found in the sample at the outreach site, facility, district or at the provincial level. It prompted developing an alternative approach which used a combination of the sample data, together with additional information about: the number of outreach vehicles; the mileage from Lusaka to the provincial capital, from the provincial capital to the district office, from the district office to each facility; the size and density of the target population; the number, size and composition of outreach teams; the number of outreach sites; the number of facilities per district; the number of districts per province, were used to construct a set of algorithms at the facility, district and provincial levels that allowed these determinants of costs and coverage to vary.
The costs of CHW in the provinces not included in the sample were estimated by adjusting the average cost of an activity in Central province and using these algorithms to take into account measures of the respective province's characteristics: the number of HFs, outreach teams, outreach sites, children and coverage levels. Sensitivity analysis substituting the average cost of other provinces found that this approach yielded results that were consistent with data from other sources and robust.
Estimating the costs per site and per HF
The cost of facility-based sites was estimated as 50% of the time of the facility's regular staff time, with the staff's number and composition estimated from the 45 HFs included in the sample. The number, composition and costs of outreach teams and sites are variable to enable accommodating widely varying local circumstances [e.g. more dispersed populations, poor or lack of roads, the availability of local transport and travel distances (from a PHO to a DHO, from a DHO to an HF and from an HF to an outreach site)]. While the outreach teams' composition and size vary, they usually (71%) consist of two health personnel and most (54%) have three volunteers. The norm (89%) of outreach sites operate at a given site for a single day.
The survey data were used to estimate the cost of an HF. The costs of all of the HFs in a particular district were estimated by multiplying the mean of the three HFs in the district by the total number of HFs in the district. To estimate the costs of all of the HFs in a particular province the mean cost per district of the three districts in the province was estimated and multiplied by the total number of districts in the province.
There were four sources of variation in the cost per outreach site: the number and mix of personnel (health staff vs community volunteers), the number of days per site and the number of teams per facility. The average cost of an outreach site (estimated from the survey data) revealed systematic variation by province. The provincial median outreach site configurations and costs are identified in Table 2 .
A fleet of more than 700 vehicles is organized to provide transport for the outreach teams and the supervision teams. MOH vehicles are supplemented with borrowed vehicles (in-kind contributions) from other government agencies and NGOs. On average, there is one vehicle for every five outreach teams. Transport costs were calculated as the cost per litre ($1.65) multiplied by the litre per kilometre (0.2) multiplied by the number of kilometres estimated as per UNICEF's budgeting tool.
The number of outreach sites per facility in the sample varied from a low of 1 to a high of 12, with both the mean and Table 3 . Zambian MOH protocols call for dosing all children 6-59 months of age twice annually with vitamin A, and deworming all children 12-59 months of age with mebendazole at least twice a year. According to the NFNC CHW programme-based coverage database, the June 2010 CHW achieved remarkable coverage rates: 106% of children aged 6-59 months for vitamin A, 108% of children aged 12-59 months for mebendazole and 115% of children aged 9-47 months for measles (Table 4) .
2 All nine provinces reached at least 80% coverage rates, the UNICEF-identified level required to realize mortality reduction impacts. Just seven of the 72 districts (9.7%) failed to reach this benchmark. The lowest performing province was Western, in which two of seven districts failed to reach 80% coverage, while the province reached 86%. The next poorest performer was Northwestern, where two of seven districts fell short of 80%, and the province as a whole reached 105%. Northern achieved 93% coverage, while 2 of its 12 districts were below the 80% threshold. Comparing these absolute and relative levels to the general healthcare access and utilization rates, it can be said that Luapula performed better and Western more poorly, than expected.
Results: the estimated costs of CHW
The estimated total costs of the June 2010 CHW are 28.3 billion ZMK, roughly 5.7 million USD. 3 Figures 5 and 6 show the breakdown of costs by implementing level of the programme and activity. The cost structure of CHW roughly mirrors the pyramidal organizational structure of the MOH, with most costs (81%) being incurred at the HF level, the district level accounting for another 11% followed by the provincial and the national level each accounting for 4%, with the national level's amount being the smallest, 1.1 billion ZMK. The highest cost activity is service delivery (fixed and outreach), accounting for 53% of the total costs of CHW. Supervision is the next highest cost, with 12%. Figure 6 presents the cost of the seven activity categories and also REASSESSING CHILD HEALTH WEEK IN ZAMBIA disaggregates the service delivery activity category into its two components: (1) service delivery at outreach sites, which accounts for 42% of total costs (12 billion ZMK) and (2) service delivery at fixed facilities (11% of total costs). Table 5 presents the estimated costs broken down by level, activity and province. Some of the activities are only implemented at one or a few, but not all four programme implementation levels. When an activity is not implemented at a particular level the row in Table 5 reporting the activity at that level is blank. At the DHO and PHO levels, the most important activity is supervision, accounting for two-thirds of total cost. At the national level, the estimated costs reported for social mobilization are slightly more than supervision (which is the second most costly activity), although this is somewhat misleading because the national level social mobilization costs are primarily due to purchases of social mobilization materials that are distributed to and throughout all four levels of the programme. Even though the costs of supervision are the highest cost activity at both the DHO and PHO levels and the second most costly activity at the national level, among total CHW costs supervision only accounts for 12% of total costs. That supervision costs constitute such an important cost at each of the three levels above the HF and yet are relatively minor in total CHW costs reflects the facts that the vast bulk of CHW costs are at the HF level.
The total costs of the national level are a small percentage of the total CHW costs. Only three activities are reported at the national level. The cost per child attended by CHW (using the number of children receiving a vitamin A capsule-the service with the highest number of eligible children, among the three key services-as the denominator) is 11 164 ZMK (or 2.23 USD). Table 6 presents provincial-specific cost measures, as well as costs per province, per child, per HF, per district, per outreach team and per outreach site, to enable investigating the relative importance of the determinants of costs and provide insights about the sources of systematic variations in costs.
1. Evidence of economies of scale: Larger, more dense populations are less expensive to serve than smaller, more dispersed populations, reflecting both the relatively high share of total costs that are personnel and the fact that personnel costs per outreach team and per outreach site are largely fixed.
Lusaka had the largest number of children treated during CHW and the highest CHW costs of the nine provinces. As shown in Figure 7 , the number of children treated per outreach site in Lusaka was more than double any other province's level and more than three times the national average. Lusaka's large, dense population enabled its outreach sites to treat more children in a day and reduce the average cost of treating a child. Lusaka's cost per child treated was 5279 ZMK, 60% of the national average and less than half of the cost of any other province, with the exception of Eastern. Eastern province's costs were low because of two factors: (1) its high population density (Table 6 , row 8) and (2) its lower cost per outreach team due to its having a relatively smaller team that is comprised of relatively fewer (though individually more costly), health staff (see Table 3 ).
Western and Northwestern have the smallest populations and the lowest population densities, coupled with inadequate transportation infrastructures. In contrast to Lusaka's large and dense population and its low cost per child treated, Western and Northwestern have the lowest average number of children per outreach site ( Figure 7 ) and per outreach team (Figure 8 ). Needing to spread the costs of the outreach site and the outreach team over a smaller number of children results in their having average costs per child attended that are more than double the national average. This reflects the fact that the major cost of CHW is personnel, not supplies, and the cost of personnel per outreach team, as well as the cost of personnel per outreach site.
2. More evidence of economies of scale: Provincial costs per child served are determined primarily by the number of sites and the average number of children treated per site; not by the number of children treated.
The costs of an outreach site are comprised of the cost of personnel (including MOH HF staff and volunteers), lunch and DSA, and the cost of supplies (including mebendazole, vitamin A capsules, measles vaccines, syringes, cotton and other service inputs). Table 7 uses cost data from Central province to exemplify how the cost of an outreach site varies by the number of children treated at the site. It considers both the cases when the CHW package includes measles and when it does not. It shows that as the number of children treated at the site increases, total costs increase, but the cost per child treated falls. These changes in costs occur because most of the costs of a site are determined by the number and mix of staff and are independent of the number of children served: once the number of staff is determined, variations in the planned number of children to be served are accommodated by increasing or decreasing the number of hours the sites are staffed. While treating additional children requires additional supplies (and thus increases total costs), because supplies constitute such a small proportion of the total costs, as the number of children treated increases the larger and fixed personnel-related costs (of personnel, lunch and DSA) are spread out over more children and reduce this much larger cost per child by so much that it results in pulling down the overall average cost per child treated and the percentage of total costs accounted for by staff-related costs.
When the cost of supplies constitutes a larger proportion of total costs-as when measles is included in the CHW packagethe reduction in average costs per child that occurs with increasing numbers of children treated is not as large as it is when the cost of medicines is smaller-such as when measles vaccinations are not given as part of CHW, as shown in Table 7 . In economic terms, the personnel-related costs of an operating outreach site are 'fixed costs' (i.e. they do not change with output level-the number of children treated). In contrast, the costs of medicines and other supplies are 'variable costs' which do change as the level of output changes. In short, at a given outreach site, there are economies of scale. Still, within each of these service packages-that is, when CHW is provided with measles and when CHW is provided without measles- Table 7 shows that increasing the number of children seen at a given outreach site increases total costs, but results in reducing the average cost per child served, reflecting what is referred to as economics of scale.
Evidence of economies of scope: Costs by service
As already noted, all MOH CHW service delivery sites provided vitamin A supplementation, deworming and measles. (Other commonly provided services were shown in Table 2 ). We assigned costs to particular services and examined how adding services to CHW would affect its total cost and cost per child treated, and developed an estimate of the cost of CHW in its more routine mode; i.e. when CHW does not include measles, which is a relatively costly service to provide. We estimated the cost of delivering specific services to children, and-given that the only service delivery data available on CHW are limited to vitamin A, deworming and measles-we constructed and assigned all costs to one of four categories: vitamin A, deworming, measles and 'all other' costs. 4 Many of the costs of CHW are joint or shared costs that would be incurred by CHW regardless of whether only one of its three services or all of them were provided because these activities must be done regardless of the number of service types provided, and these costs do not change if the number of service types changes. These costs, constituting 17% of CHW's total costs, stem from three activities: (1) social mobilization, (2) supervision and (3) data collection and report writing. As may be seen in section A of Table 8 , we assigned equal shares of them to each of the three service types. The remaining 83% of the total costs of CHW are service-specific costs. From the perspective of inputs, these service-specific costs include: (1) the costs of personnel who are dedicated to delivering a particular service in the delivery site setup, (2) the amount of time spent discussing a particular service in orientation and sensitization meetings (at all programme implementation levels) and (3) the cost of medicines, medical supplies and other inputs used to deliver a particular service. From an activity perspective, these costs arise from four CHW activities: (1) service delivery, (2) sensitization, (3) orientation and (4) supplies and logistics. How these costs varied across the three types of services and by activity can be seen in Table 8 . The 'service delivery' activity costs of vitamin A were found to be identical to those of deworming, and each was less than half of the service delivery-specific costs of measles. In the case of 'sensitization and orientation', vitamin A-specific costs were again very similar to (99% of) those of deworming, although the sum of the service-specific costs of vitamin A and deworming was less than half of the service-specific costs of measles. In the case of the fourth, and the most different of the vitamin A-and deworming-specific costs, the supplies and logistics costs of vitamin A were about ZMK 400 000, 62% of the costs of deworming. Table 8 , section A shows the total cost of providing each of the three key CHW services, the number of children who received each of the interventions, and the cost per child receiving each of these services using service-specific denominators (from tally sheets). 5 The cost of delivering a vitamin A capsule is the least expensive of these services at 2334 ZMK per child. Deworming comes in a close second at 2752 ZMK per child. Measles is more than three times as expensive as either of these services and accounts for 57% of the total cost of CHW. A large share (45%) of the additional 11.9 million ZMK in costs of measles is due to measles-specific medical supplies: they require more inputs in terms of vaccines, syringes, cotton and safety boxes. The remaining 55% is due to having an additional MOH staff-person providing care at the CHW service delivery sites (to prepare the vaccine) and, in the case of the outreach teams, the additional lunch and DSA costs that an additional health staff required. While the measles rounds have more costs, they also have more resources and higher turnouts.
Estimating the costs of alternative CHW service configurations
To investigate the cost of alternative CHW service configurations, we estimated costs by type of service two other ways. First, we dropped the measles-specific costs and reassigned measles' 'all other' costs in equal proportions to vitamin A and deworming. These are the estimates presented in Table 8 , section B: a more routine round without measles. Second, we developed estimates of the costs of three stand-alone activities, by reassigning the 'all other' costs to the one specific stand-alone activity at hand. For example, to estimate the stand-alone costs of a CHW that included just vitamin A supplementation, we reassigned the 'all other' costs to vitamin A, and similarly for deworming. These are the estimates presented in Table 8 , section C: total cost of stand-alone rounds. These alternative approaches to assigning the services' shared costs allow us to estimate the cost reductions (i.e. the improvements in efficiency) that are attributable to economies of scope. These are rough approximations, but they provide an idea of the order of magnitude of the differences in the resource requirements of one round of the better-funded, once every 3 years measles round, as opposed to a more routine CHW round. Here are three alternative ways of viewing the cost savings that Zambia has realized due to economies of scope:
(1) The sum of the cost of a stand-alone round of vitamin A (9067 million ZMK) and a stand-alone round of deworming (9310 million ZMK) is 18 377 million ZMK; combining them into a single CHW round reduces the cost of providing them in their own CHW-like event by 11%. (2) The sum of the costs of three stand-alone, one-service CHW-like interventions is 37 750 million ZMK per round. Combining all three services into a single CHW round would reduce costs by 25% (3) If CHW included only vitamin A and deworming the total cost of vitamin A capsule distribution would increase from 5.9 to 8.1 million ZMK and the total cost of deworming would increase from 6.2 to 8.3 million ZMK. Assuming the same number of children would be provided each of these services, dropping measles would result in an increase in the average cost per child served from 2334 to 3187 (37%) for vitamin A and from 2752 to 3719 ZMK (35%) for deworming.
Zambia has enjoyed substantial economies of scope from expanding its CHW service package, i.e. falling average costs per child receiving any particular service, as it expanded the number of services provided, going from a vitamin A supplementation (VAS)-only programme, to a VAS-deworming programme and from there to include other services as well. It is not clear from this study, however, whether in some districts that have added more services (i.e. more than the required minimum package) that they may have added too many additional services such that they have reduced the efficiency of CHW [by, e.g. creating too much work for the same outreach team to do in the same amount of time (usually 1 day)], or if they may have created logistics requirements that are more frequently unrealized, or discouraged mothers from attending CHW because the queues become lengthy or, worse yet, mothers find they need to return a second day to receive some/all of the services offered. In other words, this study has not addressed whether or not some districts have already changed their service packages in a way that they no longer are enjoying the economies of scope that the programme, as a whole, currently realizes. At a more general, national level, whether or not additional services might be added without increasing the average cost of providing any particular service to a child is also uncertain. It would depend, in part, on the capacity at which the outreach sites are now operating, and whether additional services might require additional personnel. It would also depend upon the personnel, input and logistics requirements of the services being considered. On the one hand, the fact that measles-a personnel-intensive service-could be added and high coverage rates could be maintained suggests that there is adequate excess capacity to absorb one or more new services. On the other hand, however, adding an intervention like the distribution of insecticide-treated bednets-which have much greater logistics requirements due to their bulk (in terms of transport, warehousing and demonstrating use)-could well undermine CHW's high coverage rate and increase the cost of distributing each of the services in the CHW package. Answering this important question will require better understanding the number, mix and input requirements of the new services being considered, as well as of the other services that districts are currently providing at their own discretion.
Two caveats should be noted about how mothers' participation rates might be affected by modifying the CHW service package. First, if the package were reduced, the participation rate in CHW might not be as high as it is, and, in particular, as high as it was in June 2010. A limitation of this study is that it is not an analysis of societal costs. It is focused only on the costs of providing CHW. We do not have any information about households' costs of participating in CHW, or about what households' costs would have been if they were to obtain the same services from fixed-site clinics. In that event, no doubt (other things being equal), the costs to an individual household would have been higher and coverage rates would have been lower. This is consistent with the substantial, albeit anecdotal, evidence that mothers value CHW and attend it because it provides an opportunity for 'one stop shopping'; it allows them to economize on the direct and indirect costs of obtaining care (including transportation costs, travel time and foregoing other activities) by being able to take all of their 6-59-month-old children to a single service delivery site and obtain multiple services in a single visit. This suggests that if the size or composition of the CHW service package was changed, that participation (coverage) rates would fall. By inference, CHW changes the incidence of costs, shifting them away from households to other agents in society that provide the resources to implement CHW.
The second caveat concerning the high coverage rate of the June 2010 CHW round is that it reflects the greater availability of resources for social mobilization-related activities due to the expanded service delivery package, and more specifically, its inclusion of measles, a priority of donors. In sum, the measles component of the CHW likely resulted in more demand for reasons related both to supply or service provision considerations (which resulted in higher than 'usual' CHW expenditures or costs), as well as to demand; namely households' costs and participation considerations. These demand-side considerations are particularly important to keep in mind when thinking about not only the total cost of CHW, but its efficiency, as measured by the average cost per child. Increased participation rates mean an increased denominator in the calculation of the average cost per child, which translates (other things being equal) into lower average cost per child, and conversely, assuming costs remain constant, lower participation rates, therefore, result in higher average cost per child.
5. Estimating the impact and cost-effectiveness of CHW Our methodology for estimating the impact of CHW is a second-best approach. We do not have a control group or baseline nutrition status data, or for that matter any individuallevel data. By default, we rely on impact estimates from studies performed in other countries. We adopted as our starting point the tool developed by Stein et al. (2005) for estimating DALYs due to VAD, and have incorporated Zambian-specific parameters, as well as two updates: (1) the more recent Lancet nutrition series-identified VAD-attributable share of general U5 mortality as 6.5% (Black et al. 2008) , and (2) the assumption that a single high-dose vitamin A capsule provides 2.5 months of protection to those who receive at least two capsules in a year (92% of the 6-59-month-olds in Zambia in 2010). 6 We estimate that VAD annually accounts for the loss of 3714 lives and a total of 108 246 DALYs in Zambia, and that the VAS component of CHW (alone) annually saves 1323 deaths and 38 148 DALYs (due to both mortality and morbidity). Using the total annual cost of the 2010 CHW round as the basis of the calculation, the CHW cost per life saved is 33.8 million ZMK (US$6757) and the cost per DALY saved is 1.2 million ZMK (US$234). Alternatively, if the total annual cost of providing two of the more common CHW rounds (i.e. without the relatively more expensive measles), the cost per life saved is 24.8 million ZMK (US$4958) and the cost per DALY saved is 860 000 ZMK (US$172). If only those CHW costs that stem from the delivery of vitamin A in the more common CHW are included in the calculation, the cost per DALY saved is 367 000 ZMK (US$73). WHO has established criteria for assessing the cost-effectiveness of a health programme by measuring its cost per DALY relative to a country's per capita GDP. 'Cost-effective' interventions are those with a cost per DALY saved of less than between one and three times per capita GDP. 'Very cost-effective' interventions have a cost per DALY saved that is less than per capita GDP (WHO 2003) . The cost per DALY of the highest of these three alternative cost estimates is 5.8% of per capita GDP. According to the WHO metric, CHW is a 'very cost-effective' intervention.
Discussion
As of mid-2012, Zambia has just completed a new 5-year national food and nutrition strategy and is undertaking a nutrition sector review. As part of this process, the role and significance of CHW is being reassessed. Has CHW served its REASSESSING CHILD HEALTH WEEK IN ZAMBIA purpose? Is it now time to discontinue these mass mobilizations? Is CHW distracting Zambia from designing and/or implementing other micronutrient interventions that might be more effective, or more cost effective or more sustainable? Are CHW now compromising the effectiveness of the MOH in providing other services?
Since 1998, UNICEF and WHO's guidelines have called for two or three annual distributions of high-dose vitamin A capsules per year (WHO 2011). After nearly two decades during which the recommended norm has been to have semi-annual supplementations, there is now growing recognition that the effectiveness of high-dose VACs-as measured by serum retinol levels-is more transient than had long been widely thought to be the case. Indeed, in light of a newly developing consensus that high-dose VACs increase serum retinol levels for only $2 months (Pedro et al. 2004; Mason et al. 2011; Palmer et al. 2012 ), WHO's recommended frequency of supplementation is only about half that required to more permanently and sustainably overcome VAD. As Palmer et al. urge, however, This should not be interpreted as program failure . . . Rather, it underscores a persistent inadequacy of dietary VA among young children, made worse, perhaps, by frequent infections that can lower VA status and a need to continue universal VA supplementation (with other public health initiatives) to protect young children from deficiency-related mortality while taking more urgent steps to improve dietary VA intake and breast-feeding rates (Palmer et al. 2012, p. 13 ).
CHW provides not only VAS but also deworming and other services. CHW provides high coverage of deworming, which is known to be effective in reducing iron deficiency and stunting (Ramakrishnan et al. 2004; WHO 2005; Gulani et al. 2007) . While the prevalence of stunting in Zambia is among the highest in the world, there has been progress and it is highly plausible that some of the credit for this progress is attributable to CHW. The proportion of Zambian children aged 6-59 months who are stunted fell from 54.2% in 2006 54.2% in to 46.7% in 2010 54.2% in (CSO 2011 . It is noteworthy that the two provinces which have the lowest CHW coverage rates-Western and Northwestern-were two of the three provinces that had the smallest declines in stunting over that time period.
If Zambia eliminated CHW and relied exclusively on its facility-based programme, coverage rates of vitamin A supplementation and deworming would fall. The service with the best facility-based coverage rates is immunization, and its coverage rates are substantially lower than those of CHW. According to the 2010 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS), the proportion of fully vaccinated children is 55.4%, considerably below the 'full' coverage rates of CHW. Whereas the coverage rates of CHW are virtually the entire population, the fully immunized child coverage rate ranges from 61.8% among the non-poor to 60.7 among the moderately poor, and dips to 48.0% among the extremely poor (CSO 2011, p. 258 ). Thus, not only is CHW providing higher coverage than would otherwise be achieved, it is doing so in a manner that is pro-poor.
CHW effectively expands coverage by reducing households' direct and indirect costs of obtaining care-the time spent travelling and costs of travel, and the fact that several services are provided at once, and making it cheaper and easier for them to participate. The MOH's reliance upon volunteers to provide 60% of the manpower required to implement CHW not only expands the coverage of CHW services but does so at costs which are substantially less than those that would be incurred if they were to be delivered through routine services. Providing these services through routine services would result in total time and transportation costs associated with obtaining CHW services increasing and being shifted from the relatively much smaller number of providers to the beneficiaries. At the same time, personnel costs would more than double, resulting in a net increase in total costs of at least one-third. Demand would almost certainly be less, resulting in fewer children receiving services. Even if demand were the same, it is not clear if the MOH would have adequate capacity to provide the substantial additional number of in-facility visits since CHW enables volunteers to 'stretch' MOH staff, temporarily increasing the MOH's service provision capacity. For the CHW-provided services to be provided through routine services, therefore, would require substantially more staff time. Thus, the likely outcome of ending CHW would be higher total costs, higher average costs and less coverage.
In sum, from either a health or an economic perspective, abandoning CHW in Zambia at this time would be ill-advised: it would risk some of the health gains that Zambia has made in the past decade. Even though the coverage rate of Zambia's CHW has long been among the highest in the world of similar such programmes, deficiencies of vitamin A and iron remain unacceptably high and continue to constitute a public health problem: there continues to be a need for this very cost-effective intervention.
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Endnotes
1 In Zambia, as throughout the world, population-based healthcare utilization and immunization surveys consistently find coverage rates to be considerably lower than those reported by programme data. The Zambian Demographic and Health Survey, for instance, found CHW coverage rates in 2001/2 to be 67% in 2001/2 and 60% in 2007. There is an extensive literature discussing the reasons for these inconsistencies (Gareaballah and Loevinsohn 1989; Murray et al. 2003; Lim et al. 2008) . 2 The source of the numerator, the number of children receiving each service, is the NFNC's CHW programme-based database. This database is a district-based report that is collated by each DHO shortly after a round of CHW and submitted to the district office. It includes the target number of children in each district for each service, and the number of children receiving each service during the recent CHW event, as reported on tally sheets at each service delivery site. The target population for each service is the GRZ's official total district population for that target population group. The denominator is the equivalent of the total target population because the Ministry of Health's objective is to provide 100% coverage. DHO officials claim that the GRZ population data (at the time of the interview) were extrapolations of the 2000 census data and were misleading and systematically under-reported due, among other things, to the abating degree of virulence of the HIVA/AIDS epidemic. It is also possible that the number of children served may have included children from outside the catchment area. 3 The official exchange rate at the time was US$1.00 to ZMK 5 000. 4 The reader is reminded that the service delivery statistics are limited to the number of children receiving vitamin A supplements, the number dewormed and the number given measles vaccinations.
To the extent to which other other services were provided, the costs of these three services will be overstated. 5 The sum of the number of children receiving each of the services reported in Table 8 is less than the denominator that was used in Table 6 to develop a more comprehensive (all-three-service average number of children treated). In the Table 6 calculations, we used the number of children receiving any vitamin A, which was the service with the largest number of eligible children. 6 The 2.5 months figure is derived from the '<3 months' of Mason et al. (2011) and '8-10 weeks' of Palmer et al. (2012) . This constitutes a 58% reduction in the 6-month-based estimate that to date has been commonly used.
